ABC Network - Seattle 1929-Linden's

KYA studio, 1929

Click Comparison of ABC and NBC program schedules - 1929
Note the dramatic difference in the number of hours ABC was programming vs NBC

Because Linden aspired to his station and his network’s greatness, he set KJR and

KYA up with huge musical and dramatic staffs and hired high respected

professionals to lead them. So, compared to the typical structure of radio stations

at the time, with some network programming and some in-studio musicians

performing, Linden’s stations had musicians playing virtually full days of

programming on the ABC. It was a sound artistic strategy, and ABC was often

saluted in the west as having the

best programming on the radio

networks. However, it was an

ultimately reckless financial

strategy.

NBC and CBS operated in a “traditional” network manner. Their business was

selling airtime of their affiliated stations to sponsors. The network compensated

the stations for that airtime in varying ways. In NBC’s case the network initially

charged its affiliates for non-sponsored (known as sustaining) programs which it

provided to stations to help fill their airtime and then paid them, at a reduced

rate, for station airtime they used for commercially sponsored programs. CBS had

a somewhat different approach in which it gave stations the use of sustaining

programs in exchange for no-fee use of a specified number of hours of station

airtime while paying them for additional hours used.

Both NBC and CBS, however, were essentially in the business of selling airtime

and, other than for sustaining programming offered to affiliates, didn’t produce

the large, expensive programs that were sponsored. The client (sponsor) actually

paid the costs of producing those programs.

Moreover,

in 1929 when ABC

was in the

ascendency,

neither NBC nor

CBS produced full

days of network

content. On some

days, such as

Sundays, they may have only offered one or two programs during the entire day

which, since Sunday programs were not likely sponsored, both reduced their

sustaining program production costs as well as their line charges for network

interconnection (which were charged by the hour).

That wasn’t Linden’s vision. Because he had hired huge staffs of musicians in both

Seattle and San Francisco and had

them working full days, the ABC

offered MANY more hours of daily

programming than either NBC or CBS

(or even for their two combined

schedules). Because network sponsors

had gravitated to the evening hours,

neither NBC nor CBS had very much in

the way of sponsored daytime

programming. So ABC’s decision to program virtually full broadcast days from 7 am

through to midnight meant that ABC was offering programming during daytime

hours for which no sponsor could realistically be found.

In a 1928 speech to the American Association of Advertising Agencies, the

president of one of the nation’s leading advertising

agencies predicted that would change in 1929. He

believed sponsors would buy out the networks’

evening programming hours causing many to newly

seek daytime schedules. It seems likely that

Linden shared that expectation since he quoted it

in ABC’s June, 1929 stock offering notice. No one

counted on the October 1929 Stock Market Crash,

of course.

So, essentially Liden’s business plan was to:

• Program essentially full broadcast days

• Pay for staff musicians to fill those many hours

• Pay for the line charges to run full broadcast days on the ABC

• Use the grander nature of the ABC to attract affiliates and sponsors in competition

with the somewhat lesser efforts of NBC and CBS

However, it was impossible to sustain those unusually high costs (compared to NBC

and CBS) from the revenues that could be generated for sponsorship of ABC’s

evening programming (which in fact turned out to never be particularly heavily

sponsored).

ABC’s position was somewhat helped because CBS, which had no significant

western U.S. coverage of its own, contracted to have the ABC carry some CBS

evening programming when the CBS sponsor chose to pay additional airtime costs

for the added western coverage. So income from CBS’s use of the ABC would

have somewhat helped but, at most, the CBS sponsors willing to pay the added

costs for ABC carriage used only 60 to 90 minutes of ABC’s evening time.

The result, of course, was that the ABC couldn’t begin to generate sufficient

revenue from the sale of airtime to cover its higher-than-typical network

expenses. Other funding would be needed.

Because Linden aspired to his station and

his network’s greatness, he set KJR and

KYA up with huge musical and dramatic

staffs and hired high respected

professionals to lead them. So, compared

to the typical structure of radio stations

at the time, with some network

programming and some in-studio musicians

performing, Linden’s stations had

musicians playing virtually full days of

programming on the ABC. It was a sound

artistic

strategy, and

ABC was often

saluted in the

west as having

the best

programming on the radio networks.

However, it was an ultimately reckless

financial strategy.

NBC and CBS operated in a “traditional”

network manner. Their business was

selling airtime of their affiliated stations

to sponsors. The network compensated

the stations for that airtime in varying

ways. In NBC’s case the network initially

charged its affiliates for non-sponsored

(known as sustaining) programs which it

provided to stations to help fill their

airtime and then paid them, at a reduced

rate, for station airtime they used for

commercially sponsored programs. CBS

had a somewhat different approach in

which it gave stations the use of

sustaining programs in exchange for

no-fee use of a specified number of hours

of station airtime while paying them for

additional

hours used.

Both NBC and

CBS,

however, were essentially in the business

of selling airtime and, other than for

sustaining programming offered to

affiliates, didn’t

produce the

large, expensive

programs that

were sponsored.

The client (sponsor) actually paid the

costs of producing those programs.

Moreover, in

1929 when ABC

was in the

ascendency,

neither NBC nor

CBS produced

full days of network

content. On some days, such as Sundays,

they may have only offered one or two

programs during the entire day which,

since Sunday programs were not likely

sponsored, both reduced their sustaining

program production costs as well as their

line charges for network interconnection

(which were charged by the hour).

That wasn’t Linden’s vision. Because he

had hired huge staffs of musicians in both

Seattle and San Francisco and had them

working full days, the ABC offered MANY

more hours of daily programming than

either NBC or CBS (or even for their two

combined schedules). Because network

sponsors had gravitated to the evening

hours, neither NBC nor CBS had very

much in the way of sponsored daytime

programming. So ABC’s decision to

program virtually full broadcast days from

7 am through to midnight meant that ABC

was offering programming during daytime

hours for which no sponsor could

realistically be found.

In a 1928 speech to the American

Association of Advertising Agencies, the

president of one of the nation’s leading

advertising agencies predicted that would

change in 1929. He believed sponsors

would buy out the networks’ evening

programming hours causing many to newly

seek daytime schedules. It seems likely

that Linden shared that expectation since

he quoted it in ABC’s June, 1929 stock

offering notice. No one counted on the

October 1929 Stock Market Crash, of

course.

So, essentially Liden’s business plan was

to:

• Program essentially full broadcast days

• Pay for staff musicians to fill those many

hours

• Pay for the line charges to run full

broadcast days on the ABC

• Use the grander nature of the ABC to

attract affiliates and sponsors in

competition with the somewhat lesser

efforts of NBC and CBS

However, it was impossible to sustain

those unusually high costs (compared to

NBC and CBS) from the revenues that

could be generated for sponsorship of

ABC’s evening programming (which in fact

turned out to never be particularly

heavily sponsored).

ABC’s position was somewhat helped

because CBS, which had no significant

western U.S. coverage of its own,

contracted to have the ABC carry some

CBS evening programming when the CBS

sponsor chose to pay additional airtime

costs for the added western coverage. So

income from CBS’s use of the ABC would

have somewhat helped but, at most, the

CBS sponsors willing to pay the added

costs for ABC carriage used only 60 to 90

minutes of ABC’s evening time.

The result, of course, was that the ABC

couldn’t begin to generate sufficient

revenue from the sale of airtime to cover

its higher-than-typical network expenses.

Other funding would be needed.