KYA studio, 1929
Click Comparison of ABC and NBC program schedules - 1929
Note the dramatic difference in the number of hours ABC was programming vs NBC
Because Linden aspired to his station and his network’s greatness, he set KJR and
KYA up with huge musical and dramatic staffs and hired high respected
professionals to lead them. So, compared to the typical structure of radio stations
at the time, with some network programming and some in-studio musicians
performing, Linden’s stations had musicians playing virtually full days of
programming on the ABC. It was a sound artistic strategy, and ABC was often
saluted in the west as having the best programming on the radio networks.
However, it was an ultimately
reckless financial strategy.
NBC and CBS operated in a
“traditional” network manner. Their business was selling airtime of their affiliated
stations to sponsors. The network compensated the stations for that airtime in
varying ways. In NBC’s case the network initially charged its affiliates for
non-sponsored (known as sustaining) programs which it provided to stations to help
fill their airtime and then paid them, at a reduced rate, for station airtime they
used for commercially sponsored programs. CBS had a somewhat different
approach in which it gave stations the use of sustaining programs in exchange for
no-fee use of a specified number of hours of station airtime while paying them for
additional hours used.
Both NBC and CBS, however, were essentially in the business of selling airtime
and, other than for sustaining programming offered to affiliates, didn’t produce
the large, expensive programs that were sponsored. The client (sponsor) actually
paid the costs of producing those programs.
Moreover, in 1929 when ABC was in the ascendency, neither NBC nor CBS
produced full days of network content. On some days, such as Sundays, they may
have only offered one or two programs during the entire day which, since Sunday
programs were not likely sponsored, both reduced their sustaining program
production costs as well as their line charges for network interconnection (which
were charged by the hour).
That wasn’t
Linden’s vision.
Because he had
hired huge staffs
of musicians in
both Seattle and
San Francisco and
had them working
full days, the ABC offered MANY more hours of daily programming than either NBC
or CBS (or even for their two combined schedules). Because network sponsors had
gravitated to the evening hours, neither NBC nor CBS had very much in the way
of sponsored daytime programming. So ABC’s decision to program virtually full
broadcast days from 7 am through to midnight meant that ABC was offering
programming during daytime hours for which no sponsor could realistically be
found.
In a 1928 speech to the American
Association of Advertising Agencies,
the president of one of the nation’s
leading advertising agencies predicted
that would change in 1929. He
believed sponsors would buy out the
networks’ evening programming hours
causing many to newly seek daytime
schedules. It seems likely that Linden
shared that expectation since he quoted it in ABC’s June, 1929 stock offering
notice. No one counted on the October 1929 Stock Market Crash, of course.
So, essentially Liden’s business plan was to:
• Program essentially full broadcast days
• Pay for staff musicians to fill those many hours
• Pay for the line charges to run full broadcast days
on the ABC
• Use the grander nature of the ABC to attract
affiliates and sponsors in competition with the
somewhat lesser efforts of NBC and CBS
However, it was impossible to sustain those
unusually high costs (compared to NBC and CBS)
from the revenues that could be generated for
sponsorship of ABC’s evening programming (which
in fact turned out to never be particularly heavily sponsored).
ABC’s position was somewhat helped because CBS, which had no significant
western U.S. coverage of its own, contracted to have the ABC carry some CBS
evening programming when the CBS sponsor chose to pay additional airtime costs
for the added western coverage. So income from CBS’s use of the ABC would
have somewhat helped but, at most, the CBS sponsors willing to pay the added
costs for ABC carriage used only 60 to 90 minutes of ABC’s evening time.
The result, of course, was that the ABC couldn’t begin to generate sufficient
revenue from the sale of airtime to cover its higher-than-typical network
expenses. Other funding would be needed.
Because Linden aspired to his station and
his network’s greatness, he set KJR and
KYA up with huge musical and dramatic
staffs and hired high respected
professionals to lead them. So, compared
to the typical structure of radio stations
at the time, with some network
programming and some in-studio musicians
performing, Linden’s stations had
musicians playing virtually full days of
programming on the ABC. It was a sound
artistic strategy, and ABC was often
saluted in the west as having the best
programming
on the radio
networks.
However, it
was an
ultimately
reckless
financial strategy.
NBC and CBS operated in a “traditional”
network manner. Their business was
selling airtime of their affiliated stations
to sponsors. The network compensated
the stations for that airtime in varying
ways. In NBC’s case the network initially
charged its affiliates for non-sponsored
(known as sustaining) programs which it
provided to stations to help fill their
airtime and then paid them, at a reduced
rate, for station airtime they used for
commercially sponsored programs. CBS
had a somewhat different approach in
which it gave stations the use of
sustaining programs in exchange for
no-fee use of a specified number of hours
of station airtime while paying them for
additional hours used.
Both NBC and CBS, however, were
essentially in the business of selling
airtime and, other than for sustaining
programming offered to affiliates, didn’t
produce the
large,
expensive
programs that
were
sponsored. The client (sponsor) actually
paid the costs of producing those
programs.
Moreover, in
1929 when ABC
was in the
ascendency,
neither NBC nor
CBS produced
full days of network content. On some
days, such as Sundays, they may have only
offered one or two programs during the
entire day which, since Sunday programs
were not likely
sponsored, both
reduced their
sustaining
program
production costs
as well as their
line charges for network interconnection
(which were charged by the hour).
That wasn’t Linden’s vision. Because he
had hired huge staffs of musicians in both
Seattle and San Francisco and had them
working full days, the ABC offered MANY
more hours of daily programming than
either NBC or CBS (or even for their two
combined schedules). Because network
sponsors had gravitated to the evening
hours, neither NBC nor CBS had very
much in the way of sponsored daytime
programming. So ABC’s decision to
program virtually full broadcast days from
7 am through to midnight meant that ABC
was offering programming during daytime
hours for which no sponsor could
realistically be found.
In a 1928 speech to the American
Association of Advertising Agencies, the
president of one of the nation’s leading
advertising agencies predicted that would
change in 1929. He believed sponsors
would buy out the networks’ evening
programming hours causing many to newly
seek daytime schedules. It seems likely
that Linden shared that expectation since
he quoted it in ABC’s June, 1929 stock
offering notice. No one counted on the
October 1929 Stock Market Crash, of
course.
So, essentially Liden’s business plan was
to:
• Program essentially full broadcast days
• Pay for staff musicians to fill those many
hours
• Pay for the line charges to run full
broadcast days on the ABC
• Use the grander nature of the ABC to
attract affiliates and sponsors in
competition with the somewhat lesser
efforts of NBC and CBS
However, it was impossible to sustain
those unusually high costs (compared to
NBC and CBS) from the revenues that
could be generated for sponsorship of
ABC’s evening programming (which in fact
turned out to never be particularly
heavily sponsored).
ABC’s position was somewhat helped
because CBS, which had no significant
western U.S. coverage of its own,
contracted to have the ABC carry some
CBS evening programming when the CBS
sponsor chose to pay additional airtime
costs for the added western coverage. So
income from CBS’s use of the ABC would
have somewhat helped but, at most, the
CBS sponsors willing to pay the added
costs for ABC carriage used only 60 to 90
minutes of ABC’s evening time.
The result, of course, was that the ABC
couldn’t begin to generate sufficient
revenue from the sale of airtime to cover
its higher-than-typical network expenses.
Other funding would be needed.